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Executive Registry

79-6744

16 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with General David Jones,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
15 March 1979 ☐

1. We talked about SALT. He indicated the Chiefs' bottom line position was to hold firm that we had to have access to telemetry.
2. We talked about NIE 3-8. Dave expressed reservations as to whether over time intelligence estimates would be nudged to support an optimistic view of the strategic balance if we put in these comparisons with the Soviet Union.

He agreed wholeheartedly, however, with the proposal to have a steering group that would supervise a further Saga simulation type endeavor. In his words, this would be a "co-equal" direction of the new effort by OSD, JCS, and DCI. Each would be able to indicate if it didn't agree with the assumptions and either request excursions or insist on expression of minority views. The objective would be to bring out all of the assumptions clearly.

We didn't directly address the issue of whether the results of the simulation would appear in the NIE, though it was implied that they would not. I did not push this issue, nor do I feel that they have to appear in the NIE. In fact, I have some qualms about it as I did last year. Dave indicated, however, he felt that the results of the further simulation should be written up and published about the same time as the next NIE so that they would be available to readers to look at in

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comparison. It seems to me that is a good solution. We may or may not find it advisable to make any reference to the simulation in the NIE. Actually, I believe it would be more appropriate to make a reference to the NIE in the simulation and compare them there. A lot will depend on how "co-equal" the development of the simulation is.

In the course of the discussion with General Jones, he mentioned that our charts on theoretical destructive potential of Soviet and US forces for intercontinental attack (Chart #2 on page 8 of the NIE) were what caused them the most trouble. They felt people would read these and not appreciate that the US component was heavily weighted by slow delivery vehicles. I pointed out this was covered later on in Chart #6 but that we could easily show an additional blue-dotted line here which would divide US capability between immediate and slow response.

3. All portions of the memorandum are classified SECRET.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

TO:

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| 2 | DDCI | | ✓ | | |
| 3 | DD/RM | | | | |
| 4 | DD/NFA | | ✓ | | |
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| 8 | DD/S&T | | | | |
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Remarks:

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Executive Secretary

Date

25X1

22 MAR 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Per your request.

*Janet
File w/ record
of CTCS meeting
B-1*

B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary

Date 21 March 1979

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

79-679

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 45/79
13 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center *JS*
FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
SUBJECT: Points for Discussion with Chairman, JCS, on Intelligence
Participation in SAGA Net Assessment

25X1 1. As you requested via [] this morning, we have drafted the attached point paper, reflecting your views as we understand them, for inclusion in your briefing book for the discussion you have scheduled with Chairman Jones on Thursday afternoon, 15 March 1979.

2. Your desire for active intelligence participation in net assessment of US and Soviet strategic forces involves important issues regarding the content of National Intelligence Estimates, the relationship between intelligence assessments and those of policy agencies, and the allocation of NFAC resources.

3. For these reasons, I am transmitting this point paper to you through normal NFAC channels in addition to the briefing book route. The estimates of resource impact contained in the point paper are from OSR. Other interested managers in NFAC have not yet had an opportunity to comment on the draft.

4. I believe a preparatory discussion between you and the Acting Director, NFAC would be desirable after you have decided whether the attached correctly reflects your position and before your meeting with Gen. Jones.

[]
Howard Stortz, Jr. []

Attachment

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SP - 45/79

SUBJECT: Points for Discussion with Chairman, JCS, on Intelligence
Participation in SAGA Net Assessment

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